This article originally appeared in the National Post.
By , April 28, 2025
The Peace Arch Border Crossing — which connects the cities of Blaine, Wash., and Surrey, B.C. — bears the words of Psalm 133: “Brethren dwelling together in unity.” While this biblical inscription testifies to the close relationship the two countries maintained for decades, the feeling in Canada today is that the brotherly relationship has become more reminiscent of the fratricidal kinship of Abel and Cain.
Apart from Ukraine, no ally or partner of the United States has faced a more radical shift in its strategic fortunes than Canada since U.S. President Donald Trump’s return to the White House. The trade dispute between the two countries poses an existential threat to Canada’s economy, while presidential comments about our territorial integrity and political sovereignty have upended the cross-border harmony and trust.
Amidst such tumult, Liberal Leader Mark Carney has signalled his intention to realign Canadian foreign relations towards the European Union and other allies. At first glance, Canada and many of its European allies share a sense of whiplash that has accompanied the Trump administration’s lurch into protectionism and potential disengagement from the Euro-Atlantic security community. Yet those similarities may obscure major differences between Canada and its European allies, and the limits of such a realignment.
Just like Canada, European militaries rely heavily on U.S. tech — especially with respect to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. Importantly, however, European states have pre-existing political and military arrangements independent of the U.S. The European defence industry is also heavily protectionist — with state-owned or heavily subsidized companies receiving preferential treatment. Consequently, the Canadian defence industry would have difficulty securing business from EU members.
Moreover, European production lines are unfit for Canadian purposes as their products are biased towards European needs. Their capacity is also mostly spoken for, with major defence contractors churning out NATO procurement for the Ukrainian conflict. Canadian orders would suffer lengthy delays. One might think that Canada should thus join the EU. Yet this solution is fanciful. Entry into that union would require Canada to relinquish sovereignty to EU institutions, and would likely take over a decade to come to fruition.
Bilateral co-operation with the U.S. is not a luxury for Canada, but a necessity, since its prosperity and security depend foremost on pursuing common interests. The Canadian defence industry, like almost every other sector, is highly integrated with the U.S., with 63 per cent of Canada’s defence exports going there in 2022. This is because the Defence Procurement Act (DPA) in the United States has a provision (Title III) that specifically allows Canadian defence companies to be treated as if they were American companies.
This unique position makes Canada the envy of the world. Indeed, it was only recently granted to two other countries, Australia and the United Kingdom, for the purposes of the AUKUS submarine pact. Should Canada lose its Title III status, it would be devastating to the already diminished Canadian capacity to produce defence equipment.
A strong pivot to Europe faces significant constraints. Some might argue that even considering this option signals that Canada is finally taking its own defence seriously. However, we think the emerging dialogue on Canadian security betrays a lack of seriousness.
The Canadian election is making an already impassioned national discussion lose more of the nuance that has traditionally characterized Canada’s approach to its southern neighbour. It has generated a “rally-around-the-flag” effect that political candidates want to exploit for votes, all while many commentators declare that Trump’s domestic agenda and foreign policy has made the United States irredeemable.
This surge in patriotism is unsurprising given the circumstances. It can be channelled positively to make national investments that would still be worthy if Trump were not president. However, it risks producing decisions that are good politics but bad policy. Certain positions floated by Canadian leaders, such as reviewing the F-35 purchase, could alienate key allies in the U.S. — both in Congress and state capitals — who will be essential for Canada to navigate the Trump administration in the years ahead.
After all, Canadian officials have signalled their resolve to addressing continental defence needs. Reviewing purchases such as the F-35 and seeking a shift in military procurement away from North America will only reinforce Canada’s perceived unwillingness to address continental security. Worse, they will further the very capability gaps that already expose Canada internationally.
Being realistic about the prospects of a shift to Europe does not entail normalizing Trump’s appalling behaviour. However, it would be wrong to confront his brand of dangerous populism with a misguided populism of our own. Abel should not commit suicide for fear of death.
Richard Shimooka, Alexander Lanoszka and Balkan Devlen are senior fellows at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute
The author of this piece has worked independently and is solely responsible for the views presented here. The opinions are not necessarily those of the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, its directors or supporters. The Macdonald-Laurier Institute is non-partisan and neither endorses nor supports candidates or political parties. We encourage our senior fellows to comment on public policy issues, including during election campaigns, but the publication of such expert commentary should not be confused with the institute taking a position for or against any party or candidate.
